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Summary
Characteristics, impacts and economic costs and ben-
efits of blast fishing have been little investigated and
they were therefore studied in Indonesia, at the scale of
individual fishing households and of Indonesian
society as a whole. Although illegal and highly de-
structive to coral reefs, blast fishing provides income
and fish to a vast number of coastal fishers who claim
that they have no alternative to make a living. Crew
members in small-, medium- and large-scale blast
fishing operations earned net incomes per month of
US$55, 146 and 197 respectively. Boat owners in the
same types of operations earned US$55, 393 and 1100
respectively. These incomes were comparable to the
highest incomes in the conventional coastal fisheries.
At the individual household level, the differences be-
tween the three types of operations show clear
incentives for scale enlargement. The cost-benefit bal-
ance at the society level was calculated with an
economic model. This analysis showed a net loss after
20 years of blast fishing of US$306 800 per km2 of coral
reef where there is a high potential value of tourism
and coastal protection, and US$33 900 per km2 of coral
reef where there is a low potential value. The main
quantifiable costs are through loss of the coastal pro-
tection function, foregone benefits of tourism, and
foregone benefits of non-destructive fisheries. The
economic costs to society are four times higher than
the total net private benefits from blast fishing in
areas with high potential value of tourism and coastal
protection. This analysis of characteristics, impact
and economics of blast fishing should help to raise the
political will to ban blast fishing from Indonesian
waters. Moreover, it allows for an evaluation of poss-
ible management solutions, taking into account their
costs and the socio-economic framework that caused
coastal fishers to start using explosives.
Keywords: Indonesia, coral reefs, blast fishing, coastal man-
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Introduction
Blast fishing was introduced in the Indonesian Archipelago in
the Second World War as an easy and profitable way to catch
schooling reef fish (Galvez et al. 1989). Nowadays, due to
generally declining catches in other sectors of coastal fisheries
(Venema 1997), the ranks of blast fishers are joined by fishers
who consider blast fishing the last opportunity to catch and
earn enough to feed their families. The explosives were orig-
inally taken from old Second World War ammunition shells,
which were dug up by fishers. At the present, bombs are
mostly made with artificial (chemical) fertilizers such as am-
monium and potassium nitrate (NH4NO3; KNO3).
Sometimes, dynamite obtained from police, military person-
nel, mining companies, or civil engineering projects is also
used (Alcala & Gomez 1987; Rubec 1988; Galvez et al. 1989).
Blast fishers hunt specifically for schooling reef fish, so
that only a few bombs will assure a relatively large catch.
Because they can use visual information on the abundance of
their prey, they consider this method to be very cost-effec-
tive. When there is no fish present, the fishers move their
activities further down the reef without having wasted much
material and time. After the charge explodes, divers enter the
water to collect the fish which have been killed or stunned by
the shock wave from the explosion. Many blast fishing oper-
ations use ‘hookah’ compressors, which supply air through
hoses to divers collecting their catch from the reef.
The actual impact of destructive fishing practices on coral
reef ecosystems and their functions is difficult to measure,
because of other, often concurrent, effects of human-induced
and natural processes such as wave-action, storms, tempera-
ture fluctuations, tectonic events, climatic disruptions,
terrestrial runoff, diseases and predator outbreaks (Wells
1993; Cesar et al. 1997). Nevertheless, blast fishing is con-
sidered one of the most destructive anthropogenic threats to
coral reef ecosystems and the damaging effects are numerous.
First is the direct effect on fish and invertebrates that inhabit
a reef. Not only are the preferred sizes and species killed, but
also commercially unattractive organisms, species and size-
classes (juveniles) fall victim to the explosion as well. Also
reefs no longer function to provide food and shelter to marine
organisms. Furthermore, once the reef structure is destroyed,
its function in protecting coastlines cannot be sustained. Last
but not least, reef-related tourism, which holds great promise
for alternative income generation on reefs that are not too
remote, cannot be developed in areas which are being blast-
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ed. Even sporadic blast fishing can destroy the reputation of
a SCUBA-diving area.
It is especially the indirect, long-term effect of destruction
of the habitat that has drawn a lot of international attention
from scientists and conservationists. The background and
possible causes for the introduction of this method have been
described by Pauly et al. (1989) and Galvez et al. (1989).
Reviews of the method and its various damaging effects have
been written by Alcala and Gomez (1979, 1987), McManus et
al. (1997) and Pet-Soede and Erdmann (1998). Some of the
effects have been modelled by Young (1991) and Saila et al.
(1993). Environmental, economic and social costs of blast
fishing have been studied and described by McAllister (1988)
and Cesar (1996). Enforcement measures to ban blast fishing
have been suggested by Pet and Djohani (1998).
In Indonesia, awareness has increased at national as well as
local levels, but this has not resulted in a reduction in the use
of destructive fishing methods. Although considerable atten-
tion has been drawn to the damaging effects of blast fishing
on reef habitats, a management and enforcement strategy to
ban this illegal practice has yet to be developed and imple-
mented. Even though officially forbidden by law (Badruddin
& Gillet 1996) and despite the dangers to the fishers them-
selves, home-made bombs remain popular fishing gear in
Indonesia. Enforcement of the laws in remote areas and at sea
is expensive and rarely implemented effectively. Local law
enforcers often lack the means and will to patrol and make ar-
rests at sea. Galvez et al. (1989) point specifically at the local
acceptance of blast fishing in the Lingayen Gulf area in the
Philippines. Corruption is a major problem at the lower
levels, usually caused by the very low salaries for government
officials working in the field.
The basic problem in the fight against destructive prac-
tices currently is still the lack of interest of national
authorities. Political will has to be developed at the higher
levels through increased awareness of economic losses due to
destructive fishing. The present paper aims to describe the
economics of blast fishing, in an attempt to quantify some of
the major impacts. In addition, a study of the costs and ben-
efits at the individual household level will help managers
understand the incentives for using destructive methods.
Estimates of neither the actual net revenues to blast fishers
nor the net economic costs to society have been presented
before in the literature. Political support for restrictive man-
agement will be greater and be carried more broadly when the
damage of blasting can be presented in monetary figures. 
Ideally, an economic valuation for coral reefs would be
based on their total economic value (TEV). This includes all
direct and indirect use values as well as non-use values
(Dixon & Sherman 1990). Such an attempt has recently been
made for coral reefs as well as for other ecosystems in a highly
publicized and criticized paper by Costanza et al. (1997).
However, most of the reef functions, such as biodiversity, re-
search and possible medicinal use cannot be monetized in a
straightforward way. Trying to include these in the analysis,
for instance through contingent valuation methods (CVM),
could undermine the credibility of the study in the eyes of the
policymakers who need to be convinced of the importance of
reef protection. Therefore, the present study focuses on the
three functions of coral reef ecosystems that can be estimated
with valuation techniques based on market prices, namely
fisheries, tourism and coastal protection.
Methods
Study area and characteristics of the fishery
Most of the input parameters for the model were derived
from a field study of blast fishing in the Spermonde
Archipelago, a coastal area in SW Sulawesi, Indonesia. This
archipelago, which was first mentioned by Umbgrove (1930),
comprises approximately 400 000 ha of coastal waters with
submerged coral reefs, coralline islands, sandy shallows and
deeper waters up to a maximum depth of 60 m. A variety of
small-scale fishing gears is operated in this area, which pro-
vides food, income and coastal protection to approximately
6500 fishing households (Department of Fisheries 1995).
From May 1995 until January 1997, fishing activities in
Spermonde were monitored at sea. The practice of blast fish-
ing was studied, the number of bombs and the catch biomass
were recorded, and on-site interviews were held. The size of
blast impacts on the corals was estimated by direct obser-
vation under water. Between May 1995 and December 1997,
all islands and major coastal villages were visited. Interviews
were held with blast-fishers and their middlemen, to collect
data on the number of trips that were made each month, the
costs of the operations, and on profit sharing systems. During
these visits, logbooks were distributed to several fishers
which subsequently recorded their daily catches for two
months. Fish auctions were attended to collect prices for
those fish categories that were found in blast catches. Prices
in Indonesian Rupiah were converted to US$ at a rate of Rp
2500 per US$1.
Three types of blast fishing operations were observed,
namely small-, medium-, and large-scale. The large-scale op-
erations used vessels 10–15 m in length with a crew typically
of 15–20 men, who embarked on week-long trips to patch
reefs or fringing reefs of uninhabited islands up to several
hundred kilometres from their origin. Bombs were thrown
from 3–4 small canoes which were launched from the mother
ship. Divers used hoses from hookah compressors on the
large ship to collect fishes up to a maximum depth of 40 m.
These compressors were also used for the collection of sea
cucumber (Holothuria spp.), lobsters (Panulirus spp.) and in
cyanide-fishing for live groupers (Serranidae) (Erdmann &
Pet-Soede 1996). The fishes were stored on ice and sold upon
arrival at major landing places. The medium-scale operations
worked similarly, but operated closer to their place of origin
and often targetted schooling pelagic fish, away from the
damaged reefs. They departed for day-long trips with smaller
boats (8–10 m) and a maximum of five crew. Small-scale,
single blast fishers used 4 m long, wooden canoes with one
outrigger, with a four-HP outboard engine, and operated
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close to their home-islands. Fish were retrieved by free-div-
ing with mask or goggles, and hence small-scale operations
were restricted to sites which were no deeper than 10–12 m.
Only small-scale operations were typically carried out within
the same small area for long periods of time (over many
years). Fishing on highly damaged reefs was not attractive to
the medium- and large-scale operations.
The fishing methods were similar for each type of oper-
ation. Fishers looked with goggles or a mask for a school of
fish from their canoes. Bombs were handmade by filling a
0.6 l beer bottle with a 1:5 mixture of kerosene and ammoni-
um nitrate. The bottles were closed with plastic tape around
a wick and a blasting cap. When a school of fish was spotted,
fishers moved their boat at least 5 m from the estimated place
of impact and lit the wick with a smouldering mosquito-coil,
which helped control the burning speed. The bomb generally
exploded after about five seconds, depending on the length of
the wick. After the charge exploded, fishers entered the water
to collect fish which had been killed or stunned by the shock
wave from the explosion.
Model structure and parameter estimation
A model was developed to calculate the costs and benefits of
blast fishing at the level of Indonesian society as a whole. This
model calculated costs and benefits for a hypothetical situ-
ation on 1 km2 of coral reef, which was in pristine condition,
and which was without other concurrent threats. The general
model was:
NBs,t  NRb,t (VN  ∆VTt VCt) (1)
where NBs,t  net quantifiable benefits to society in year t,
NRb,t  net revenues of blast fishing in year t, VN  value
(foregone revenues) of non-destructive fishing in a situation
without blast fishing and at exploitation levels near maximum
sustainable yield (constant over time), VTt  loss in value
of tourism for year t, and VCt  loss in value of coastal pro-
tection for year t. The input values for the model parameters
depended on the present quality of the coral reef.
The economic analysis was based on the differences in the
‘with’ and ‘without’ scenarios for blast fishing. In the ‘with-
out’ scenario, only sustainable non-destructive reef fisheries
take place. In the ‘with’ scenario, only blast fishing occurs.
The losses, VTt and VCt, represent the difference between
the values in the ‘with’ and ‘without’ scenarios at time t.
Calculations were carried out for two cases, a ‘high value’ and
a ‘low value’ scenario. In the ‘high value’ scenario, coastal in-
frastructure is well developed, there is considerable coastal
construction and tourism potential is high. In the ‘low value’
scenario the opposite holds, which is often the case in remote
rural areas.
Valuation was based on straightforward loss in added
value. The economic valuation of the blast fishery through
time was derived from two data points: the initial point for an
intact reef at the beginning of year 1, and the final point of
severe coral destruction, reached when 75% of the coral was
destroyed (McAllister 1988; Rubec 1988). The economic
analysis was carried out for the total time period needed to
destroy 75% of the coral on a reef, and included a 10% dis-
count rate per year. With a rate of coral destruction , this
meant that the net present values (NPV) of the individual
parameters to the general model were calculated by summa-
tion of the annual totals over 75/ years with a 10% discount
rate per year using the formula:
NPV  
75/
i  1
(2)
The total number of years needed to reach the final point of
75% coral destruction was calculated using the estimated
annual rate of coral destruction . This rate, or rather the av-
erage relative loss of corals on blasted reefs per year, was
calculated using underwater observations on the average size
of the impact area per explosion and the average number of
blasts per km2 reef per year. We assumed a circular impact
with radius r and a surface area Ab that could be calculated
using r2.
  * 100% (3)
where Ab  area destroyed by blast fishing per km
2 per year
and Ac  area covered with coral per km
2 of reef.
The data from interviews, logbooks and personal obser-
vations were combined to calculate the four input parameters
to the general model. The annual net revenue of blast fishing,
NRb,t , was calculated by subtracting the operational costs,
Cb,t , and the opportunity costs of labour, Cl,t , from the total
gross revenues of blast fishing, GRb,t :
NRb,t  GRb,t  (Cb,t  Cl,t) (4)
For the calculations of gross revenue of blast fishing in year
1, GRb,1, when this method was newly introduced, we used
estimates of total yield per km2 from the literature. The esti-
mate for gross revenue of blast fishing after destruction of
75% of the reef, was based on estimates of the average num-
ber of blast operations per km2 of coral reef, the catch (kg) per
boat per day and the price (US$) per kg fish in Spermonde
(Table 1). The yield of blast fishing was assumed to decrease
linearly with coral destruction (Fig. 1). Fishing on highly
damaged reefs was not attractive to medium- and large-scale
operations; only small-scale blast fishers were observed on
the reefs of Spermonde. Therefore, the average number of
blast operations per km2 was estimated by dividing the esti-
mated total number of operations by the total surface of coral
reefs with depths where small-scale blast fishers were active,
ranging from 4–12 m. The density of blast fishers was as-
sumed to be constant over time and equal to the number
observed in Spermonde. The average operational costs per
boat, Cb, were based on estimates of the average number of
bombs used per boat per day, the amount (kg) of fish con-
sumed, the amount (l) of fuel, and the price (US$) for fuel,
boat and engine (Table 2). The average opportunity costs
Ab
Ac
valuei
(1  discount rate)i
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(US$) of labour for blast fishing, Cl, were equal to that of un-
skilled rural labour (World Bank 1998).
Profits of blast fishing differed between the small-,
medium- and large-scale operations because of scale-specific
costs and revenues. The average catch per day of a single
small-scale blast fisherman was about 8 kg, a medium-scale
operation caught approximately 75 kg per day and a large-
scale operation caught approximately 200 kg per day or 1500
kg per 8-day trip (Table 1). The fish caught by blast fishers
was typically meant for local markets because of its poor or
medium quality. Prices for blast-caught fish varied from
US$1.00 to US$1.50 per kg in 1997, depending on whether
the fish were chilled on ice or not. The costs of fishing were
not high for blast fishing operations and included bombs,
fuel, depreciation costs for maintenance and repairs of the
boat. Small-, medium- and large-scale blast fishing opera-
tions spent US$3.25, 9.50 and 400.00 per trip respectively
(Table 2).
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Table 1 Financial data for three types of blast fishing in 1997.
Small-scale Medium-scale Large-scale
No. crew/boat 1 ( owner) 4 (incl. owner) 16 (excl. owner)
No. days/trip 1 1 8
No. trips/month 20 15 2.5
Costs1(US$/ trip) 3.25 9.5 400
Catch2 (kg/trip) 8 75 1500
Consumed (kg/trip) 2 10 100
Subsistence3 (%) 25 13 7
Sold (kg/trip) 6 65 1400
Price (US$/kg) 1 1 1.5
Owner share4 (%) 100 40 40
1see Table 2 for calculation of costs per trip. Prices showed no variance and were considered standard in 1997. 2 Sample size (n), and stan-
dard error (SE) for small-, medium-, and large-scale respectively were n  151, 13, 3 and SE  0 kg, 3 kg, and 12 kg. 3 % subsistence was
percentage of catch consumed. 4 Owner = single crew in ‘small-scale’. Owner took both ‘crew-cut’ and ‘owner-cut’ in ‘medium-scale’. Owner
was not in crew in ‘large-scale’ (no ‘crew-cut for owner’). Income was shared as follows: 3/5 (60%) for crew, 1/5 (20%) for owner, 1/5 (20%)
for ‘boat’. In practice this meant 40% for owner, out of which he paid all costs involved.
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Figure 1 Model input: relative destruction of coral reefs and their functions (% of initial) during 20 years of blast fishing. Dotted lines
represent sensitivity analysis scenarios. *: in a situation without blast fishing.
The average net profits per boat owner per month in the
blast fishery (Table 3) were estimated for boat owners in 1997
at US$55 for the small-scale operations (where the owner was
the sole crew member), US$393 for medium-scale operations
(where the owner was part of the crew) and US$1100 for
large-scale operations (where the owner was not part of the
crew). Crew members earned average incomes per month of
US$55 in small-scale operations, US$146 in medium-scale
operations and US$197 in large-scale operations (Table 3).
The annual net value of non-destructive fishing, VN, was
derived by subtracting both the operational costs, Cn, and the
opportunity costs for labour, Cl , from the total gross rev-
enues for non-destructive fishing, GRn. VN was calculated in
the ‘without’ scenario and therefore remained constant
through time (Fig. 1):
VN  GRn  (Cn  Cl) (5)
The gross revenue for non-destructive fishing, GRn, and op-
erational costs, Cn, were based on survey data from Eastern
Indonesia and literature (Hannig 1988). In a subsistence fish-
ery, many fishers were involved on a part-time basis and this
was transformed to 10 full-time fishers per km2 in line with
estimates by McManus et al. (1992). Average catch per
fisher was 5 kg, totalling 15 t km-2 yr-1 for 10 operations fish-
ing 300 days per year (Russ 1991; McManus et al. 1992;
Cesar 1996). The operational costs were estimated at US$30
per year for unmotorized fishers or US$300 per km2 per year
for 10 full-time fishers. The opportunity costs of labour for
unskilled rural workers were around US$0.9 per worker per
day or US$2700 per year for 10 full-time fishers per km2
(World Bank 1998).
The annual net value of a coral reef for tourism potential,
VTt, depended on the level of coral destruction and decreased
linearly with rate  from the initial value VT0, reaching zero
when no corals were left (Fig. 1).
VTt  VT0 (1t) (6)
Reef-related tourism in coral reef areas encompassed diving
and snorkelling and benefits differed amongst sites, depend-
ing on accessibility amongst other things.
The annual net value of a coral reef for coastal protection,
VCt, also depended on the level of coral destruction and de-
creased linearly with rate α from the initial value VC0,
reaching zero when no corals were left (Fig. 1).
VCt  VC0 (1t) (7)
Initial values of tourism potential and coastal protection, VT0
and VC0, for the ‘high value’ and ‘low value’ scenarios were
extracted from Cesar (1996), who combined data from
Riopelle (1995), field interviews, and published market data
on agricultural yields in Indonesia and used a variety of valu-
ation techniques including the loss of productivity approach
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Table 2 Costs per trip for three types of blast fishing in spring 1997.
Type Depreciation time Type of costs Total amount b Costs per trip b
a(yr) (US$) (US$)
Small-scale 10 Boat  engine 500 0.25
2–3 bombs 2.50
2 l diesel fuel 0.50
Medium-scale 10 Boat  engine 3000 1.50
2*compressor 500 0.25
dive gear 100 0.05
4–5 bombs 4.50
5 l diesel fuel 1.20
ice 2
Large-scale 10 Boat  engine 10 000 40
6*compressor 1500 6
dive gear 2250 9
50 bombs 50
225 l diesel 50
ice 45
food/cigarettes 100
police ‘fines’ 100
a Depreciation for small-, medium-, and large-scale blast fishing in 10 years respectively: 2000 day-trips, 2000 day-trips, and 250 week-trips.
b Prices showed no variance and were considered standard in 1997.
Table 3 Estimated net income (US$/month) for crew members
and boat owners from blast fishing.
Small- Medium- Large-
scale scale scale
Fish sold (kg) 120 975 3500
Revenue 120 975 5250
Costs 65 142 1000
Income crew 55 5851 31501
Net income/crew member 55 146.25 197
Net income/boat owner 55 3932 11003
1 60% crew cut of total (revenue-costs); 2 (40% owner cut + crew
member cut) – costs per month; 3 40% owner cut – costs per month.
and the replacement cost approach (Dixon & Sherman 1990).
The present values of tourism per km2 of coral reef were an-
nualized to US$55 900 representing a ‘high value’ and
US$333 for a ‘low value’ situation. Similarly, the annualized
values for coastal protection were US$61 100 for the ‘high
value’ scenario and US$2800 for the ‘low value’ scenario.
Results
Model input
The size of the coral area destroyed by a single blast de-
pended on the size of the bomb and the position of the
explosion relative to the coral reef. Our observations showed
that a beer bottle bomb shattered stony corals in an area ap-
proximately 5 m in diameter, hence the area affected per
blast was 19.6 m2. With 2–3 bombs per small-scale operation
and 2 operations, 20 days per month, 10 months per year, the
total number of blasts was estimated at 800–1200 yr km-2.
Assuming a coral cover in the target patch of 100% and an
average coral cover of the entire km2 of 50–55% in the pris-
tine situation, the rate of coral loss α was 3.75% (points) per
year. With this rate it took 20 years to destroy 75% of the
coral on a reef and thus the analysis was carried out over a
20-year time period.
In year 1, when blast fishing was newly introduced, the total
initial yield from blast fishing was estimated at 15 t km-2 yr-1
(Russ1991;McManusetal.1992;Cesar1996).Foryear20,total
yield from blast fishing was estimated at 3.2 t km-2 yr-1
using the above-mentioned estimates of two small-scale op-
erators per km2 reef who fished 200 days per year (10 months
times 20 trips per month) and caught an average of 8 kg fish
per day (Table 1). This estimate was supported by other
studies that showed maximum sustainable yields from reefs
that were heavily destroyed by explosives (75% destroyed),
which were 4–5 times less productive than intact reefs
(McAllister 1988; Rubec 1988). Fish prices in year 1 were
US$1 per kilogramme. The gross revenues for blast fishing,
GRb, were estimated at US$15 000 per km
2 in year 1 and
US$3200 per km2 in year 20. After correcting for operational
costs, Cb, which were US$1300 per year, and opportunity
costs of labour, Cb, which were US$360 per year, the annual
net revenue of blast fishing, NRb, was US$13 300 per km
2 in
year 1 and US$1500 per km2 in year 20.
In the scenario without blast fishing, yields from non-
destructive fisheries equalled the initial total yield of blast
fishing and remained constant over time at 15 t km-2 yr-1.
Again fish prices in year 1 were US$1 per kilogramme and
the gross revenues, GRn, from non-destructive fishing were
estimated at US$15 000 per km2. After correcting for the op-
erational costs for 10 fishers, Cn, which were US$300 per year
at 20% of the sales and opportunity costs, Cl of US$2700 per
year, the annual net value of non-destructive fishing, Vn, was
US$12 000 per km2 per year.
Annual values of a coral reef for tourism, VTt, decreased
with rate  of 3.75% coral destruction per year from the in-
itial value, VT0, of US$55 900 in year 1 to US$14 000 in year
20 for the ‘high value’ scenario and from initial value, VT0, of
US$333 in year 1 to US$83 in year 20 for the ‘low value’
scenario. Similarly, the annual value of a coral reef for coastal
protection, VCt, decreased from VC0 of US$61 100 to
US$15 300 in year 20 for the ‘high value’ scenario and from
US$2800 in year 1 to US$700 in year 20 for the ‘low value’
scenario.
Model output
At the level of individual fishing households, the net income
per person in small-scale blast fishing operations was calcu-
lated for year 1 by dividing the annual gross revenues per
km2, GRb, of US$15 000 over two fishers and subtracting the
operational costs, Cb, of US$650 and the annual private fish
consumption worth US$400 per fisher. Net income de-
creased in 20 years from US$6450 to US$550 (Fig. 2). The
high income in year 1 when blast fishing was newly intro-
duced formed the incentive to start blast fishing. Comparison
with non-destructive fishing in an area without blast fishing,
where each of 10 full-time fishers had an annual income of
US$1470, showed that blast fishing in the initial years was
four times more rewarding than non-destructive fishing (Fig.
2). This difference was only sustained for a short period, in
the long run (more than 20 years) the income from blast fish-
ing will reach the level of opportunity costs, Cl, of US$270.
In year 20, the income from blast fishing was only one fifth of
what could have been derived if blast fishing had not been in-
troduced (Fig. 2). The motorized and well equipped
medium- and large-scale operations that explore pristine reef
areas find high revenues which will likely compensate their
exploration costs.
At the level of the society as a whole, both the ‘high value’
and ‘low value’ scenarios showed that costs of blast fishing
through loss of tourism potential and coastal protection were
higher than the total net benefits from blast fishing (Fig. 3).
After 20 years of blast fishing, foregone benefits from tourism
totalled US$134 000 per km2 of reef in an area with a high po-
tential for tourism and coastal protection, and US$800 per
km2 in an area with a low potential (Table 4). Explosives fish-
ing generated a net loss to society of US$306 800 per km2 of
reef in the ‘high value’ scenario and US$33 900 per km2 in the
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Figure 2 Model output: annual net income for small-scale blast
fishers and small-scale fishers using non-destructive gear, with the
opportunity costs of labour. *: in a situation without blast fishing.
‘low value’ scenario (Table 4). The quantifiable costs of blast
fishing in the ‘high value’ scenario were quite evenly distrib-
uted between the foregone net benefits of fishing, tourism,
and coastal protection (Fig. 3a). In the ‘low value’ scenario,
the foregone net benefits of fishing became the main costs of
blast fishing (Fig. 3b).
Sensitivity analysis
Uncertainty surrounds the input values of the parameters in
the economic analysis. To study the robustness of these num-
bers, a sensitivity analysis was carried out for four main
assumptions. In Table 5, these calculations are presented for
both the ‘high value’ and the ‘low value’ scenarios for tourism
and coastal protection. First, the link between blast fishing
and coral destruction was assessed. In our base scenario of
severe coral destruction, 75% of the coral was destroyed after
20 years of active blasting. In the ‘high’ and ‘low’ coral de-
struction scenarios, 100% and 50% respectively were
destroyed over the same time period as in the base scenario
(Fig. 1). The resulting change in the net loss of blast fishing
to society was 34% in the ‘high value’ scenario and around
40% in the ‘low value’ scenario.
The sensitivity analysis of the link between coral destruc-
tion and coral reef fishery yield shows that net losses to
society differed only marginally from the base scenario. In
the base scenario a value of 3.2 t km-2 yr-1 was used, whereas
for the sensitivity analysis 3.84 t km-2 yr-1 was taken to repre-
sent a ‘high’ fishery yield. This value is approximately 20%
higher than in the Spermonde base scenario and was derived
by increasing the total number of day trips from 200 to 240
per year. Similarly, yield decreased by 20% to 2.56 t km-2 yr-1
to represent a scenario with a ‘low’ fishery yield. For these
‘fishery yield’ scenarios, the sensitivity analysis shows that
the costs to society differed by approximately 1% from the
base scenario in the ‘high value’ scenario and 6% in the ‘low
value’ scenario (Table 5).
Third, the functional form of the relationship between
tourism and coral destruction from blast fishing was altered.
In the base scenario, tourism was impacted with the same rate
 as coral destruction. In the ‘coral collapse’ scenario,
tourism would rapidly break down (in 3 years) after intro-
duction of blast fishing, due to reputation effects of blast
fishing on recreational divers (Fig. 1). An alternative justifi-
cation for this scenario was that future tourism potential in
the eyes of investors might decline much quicker than in the
base scenario after introduction of blast fishing. In the ‘high
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Figure 3 Model output: net present value of 20 years of blast
fishing for individuals and the associated losses to society. Two
scenarios are compared: (a) high and (b) low values for tourism
potential and coastal protection. *: in a situation without blast
fishing.
Table 4 Present value of costs and benefits of blast fishing at 10% discount rate over 20 years (US$1000 per km2). ‘High value’ scenario
means high tourism potential and coastal infrastructure; ‘low value’ scenario implies low tourism potential and coastal infrastructure.
‘High Value’ scenario: ‘Low Value’ scenario:
cost benefit cost benefit
Blast fishers
Yield  90.0 90.0
Explosives  8.5 8.5
Other costs  2.6 2.6
Opportunity labour  3.1 3.1
Net private benefits blasting  75.9  75.9
Rest of society
Foregone sustainable fisheries revenues 102.2 102.2
Foregone tourism revenues 134.0 0.8
Coastal protection 146.5 6.8
Total (rest of society) 382.7 109.8
Net benefits of blast fishing 306.8 33.9
(a)
(b)
value’ scenario, the model was highly sensitive to ‘tourism
collapse’: the net loss to society increased 95% in the ‘high
value’ scenario, and 8% in the ‘low value’ scenario (Table 5).
Fourth, a time lag was introduced in the link between
coral destruction and coastal protection. In this ‘slower
coastal loss’ scenario, the coastal protection function only
started to decline once a certain percentage (here: 20%) of
corals were destroyed (Fig. 1). This scenario was justified in
cases where the coastal protection function was still fully op-
erational while part of the corals had been destroyed. The
sensitivity analysis showed that losses to society were 21%
lower in the ‘high value’ scenario and 9% lower in the ‘low
value’ scenario (Table 5).
Discussion
Impact and losses
Blast fishing is destructive to the coral reef ecosystem and can
lead to the collapse of coral reef fisheries (McManus et al.
1997). Heavily-damaged reef areas are obviously less attrac-
tive for reef-related tourism, and foregone benefits of this
type of tourism form a considerable part of the economic
losses due to blast fishing. The coastal protection function is
also affected by this practice, as coral reefs will gradually
erode through physical and biological processes. In areas with
a high value of coral reefs for tourism and coastal protection,
the net loss to society of blast fishing was estimated at
US$306 800 per km2 of coral reef and the economic costs to
society were four times higher than the net private benefits to
blast fishers. These losses were calculated over the first 20
years after introduction of blast fishing, when tourism and
the coastal protection had not yet fully declined. This means
that foregone benefits in subsequent years (when there is no
more tourism or coastal protection) are even larger. The
model was also highly sensitive to ‘tourism collapse’, which
resulted in a 95% increase in estimated net losses to society.
Due to the difficulty of translating qualitative natural assets
into quantitative monetary values, many non-quantifiable
costs of blast fishing were not taken into account in the econ-
omic model. Therefore, the above estimates for economic
losses are quite conservative. It can be concluded that blast
fishing results in large economic losses to Indonesian society,
especially when taking into account the vast areas of coral
reefs that are threatened in this country.
Nevertheless, for individual fishers, the financial incen-
tives to start blast fishing are obvious, especially in a situation
with pristine coral reefs. Andersson (1995) reports that in
Mafia Island, Tanzania, blast fishers catch in two days as
much as other fishers catch in 20 days. A financial analysis at
the individual household level also shows clear incentives for
scale-enlargement. Both crew members and boat owners had
the highest net income per month in the large-scale blast fish-
ing operations with US$197 and US$1100 respectively.
Medium-scale and large-scale operations typically work in
pristine areas and therefore blast fishing will continue to
spread into the most remote areas unless very firm action is
taken to combat this practice. For the individual fisher in-
volved in blast fishing, the net income is all that matters and
he does not take his contribution to ecosystem damage into
account.
Management options
Although the practice of fishing with explosives goes back
many years, the study of its distribution and impact is of
recent origin and incomplete. This results in a situation
where the need to act is not yet obvious to the authorities.
Awareness of the economic consequences of destructive fish-
ing practices is lacking for most government officials.
Although some blast fishers were aware that their activities
destroy the habitat that the fish are dependent upon, they
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Table 5 Results of the sensitivity analysis for the economic valuation of blast fishing.
Benefits & Losses Net private Loss of Loss of Foregone Net loss of 
benefits from tourism coastal sustainable blast fishing 
Scenarios blast fishing revenues protection fishery income to society
Scenario ‘High value’
Base scenario 75.9 134.0 146.5 102.2 306.8
High coral destruction 66.1 178.6 195.3 102.2 410.0
Low coral destruction 88.3 89.3 97.6 102.2 200.7
High fishery yield 77.9 134.0 146.5 102.2 304.7
Low fishery yield 73.8 134.0 146.5 102.2 308.8
Tourism collapse 75.9 426.5 146.5 102.2 599.3
Slower coastal loss 75.9 134.0 83.1 102.2 243.4
Scenario ‘Low value’
Base scenario 75.9 0.8 6.8 102.2 33.9
High coral destruction 66.1 1.1 9.0 102.2 46.2
Low coral destruction 88.3 0.5 4.5 102.2 18.9
High fishery yield 77.9 0.8 6.8 102.2 31.8
Low fishery yield 73.8 0.8 6.8 102.2 35.9
Tourism collapse 75.9 3.5 6.8 102.2 36.6
Slower coastal loss 75.9 0.8 3.8 102.2 30.9
were hardly aware that their activities threatened their own
existence. All fishers that were interviewed commented that
their ‘home-reefs’ had deteriorated due to blast fishing, but
they also added that there were plenty of undamaged reefs
further out (Pet-Soede, unpublished data). The fishers re-
garded the size of their boats as limiting rather than the
available resource space. A comprehensive awareness pro-
gramme is therefore needed to provide fishers with
information on the status of the coral reefs. In Komodo
National Park, Indonesia, an awareness campaign was carried
out explaining to villagers the results of a monitoring pro-
gramme which showed coral mortality to range from
50–80% in badly affected areas (Pet & Djohani 1998). This
campaign, combined with a rigorous enforcement pro-
gramme, greatly contributed to the reduction of blast fishing
in the Komodo area (Fig. 4).
Interventions to ban blast fishing must include the devel-
opment of alternative livelihoods for local fishers. If and
when enforcement programmes are effective in pushing the
blast fishers out of the practice, other income opportunities
need to be available. Many blast fishers argued that they had
no alternatives, although in many coastal areas, economic ac-
tivities can be developed in the fields of pelagic fisheries,
mariculture and tourism. It depends on the socio-economic
and cultural character of the fishing community and on other
factors such as the available natural resources and infrastruc-
ture, as to which type of alternative livelihood is acceptable
and feasible. Indonesia, with its many islands, long coastline
and productive marine waters, has always been a fishing
nation. It has been concluded, however, that most of
Indonesia’s coral reef resources are presently over-exploited
(Venema 1997). Yet there is still sufficient scope to shift from
coral reef fisheries into pelagic fisheries. Furthermore,
Indonesia has a large potential for the development of mari-
culture. Vogt (1997) evaluated economic benefits of a
protected coral area for reef-related tourism operators in the
Philippines. The financial benefits of transporting tourists to
resort islands were found to be substantial even to fishers
using only their outrigger boats. These fishers could also sell
souvenirs. Fishers’ benefits exceeded the losses due to re-
duced catches. The income for resort owners and tour
operators was found to be strongly dependent on the quality
of the coral reefs. The presence of tourists also makes it
harder for fishers to continue blasting without being noticed.
Although the profits and incomes in blast fishing are com-
parable to the highest profits and incomes in the conventional
fisheries, blast fishers do not switch voluntarily to non-de-
structive methods. Non-blast fishers and blast fishers
unanimously stated that the reason for fishing with explosives
is ‘to earn money the easy way’ (Galvez et al. 1989; Pet-Soede
& Erdmann 1998). Fishers occupied in blast fishing opera-
tions will have to be forced into alternative livelihoods by
strong enforcement programmes. Government officials at the
national level need to become more involved in the design of
enforcement strategies and in the abatement of corruption.
The Fisheries Law No. 9, signed on 19 June 1985 by the
President of Indonesia, includes prohibition of the use of de-
structive fishing techniques such as explosives, poison and
electrical techniques (Badruddin & Gillet 1996). The penal-
ties upon conviction of breaking these regulations are up to
10 years in jail and/or a Rp 100 million fine. The marine
police and navy, together with the fisheries service, are re-
sponsible for enforcement and control of the Indonesian
waters. These authorities are occasionally involved in ad hoc
enforcement of the laws against destructive fishing, but no
structural plan has been implemented on national or local
levels. The general lack of funds and facilities for enforce-
ment of the fisheries law, the lack of knowledge and
awareness of the responsible individuals, and the overall cor-
ruption and lack of political will at all levels, mean that
enforcement of laws against destructive fishing has not yet
been implemented effectively.
Indonesian fishers traditionally have a strong relationship
with their middlemen. These middlemen provide credit to
the fishers who, in return, must sell their catch for a set low
price. This relationship usually turns out to be a life-long
commitment to the middlemen who also tell the fishers what
species to fish for, depending on the market prices. In this
way many fishers have entered the destructive fishery even
when they themselves did not intend to do so in the first
place. Even when awareness about the damaging effects of
blast fishing is increased at the fishers’ level, fishers will not
be free to stop those practices if their middlemen do not
agree. Fishers will only change their ways of fishing when
this is initiated by their ‘bosses’, or when they can be ‘freed’
from these middlemen by credit from more bona fide insti-
tutes. Unfortunately, corruption has made fishers very wary
of government credit programmes but there is definitely
scope for the development of locally managed credit systems.
Applied research in the field of coastal resources manage-
ment is needed to support decision-making processes at all
levels of management. Effective management is impossible
without a constant flow of information on the resources and
exploitation patterns. ‘Local-knowledge’ is important but in-
sufficient for planning and evaluation of management
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Figure 4 Trends in number of fish bombing incidents per month,
Komodo National Park 1996. (Modified from Pet & Djohani 1998).
interventions. Monitoring programmes need to be imple-
mented and the systems for data collection and analysis need
to be improved, especially at the local level. At present, many
discussions amongst local stakeholders cannot be concluded
since there is no information available and there is therefore
no consensus on the status of the resource and on the patterns
of resource utilization. Applied research in support of effec-
tive decision-making is also urgently needed in the fields of
legislation and habitat restoration.
The role of the Government
The management of coastal and marine resources in
Indonesia is heavily focused on increasing fisheries’ landings.
Optimization of the fisheries’ output is perceived as a process
which should be achieved through increasing exploitation
levels rather than through protection and restriction.
Indonesia’s 5-year plans (Repelita) invariably mention how
‘intensification’ and ‘diversification’ of the fisheries should
alleviate the poor coastal communities and provide the
nation with more food, employment and foreign currency.
With respect to destructive fishing practices, government
and the fisheries sector interact over little more than the li-
censing of fishing vessels. The owner of a vessel has little
problem in obtaining a fishing license, considering the gen-
eral policy of encouraging intensification. Control of the
vessel’s activities hardly exists. The main worries of fisheries
officials in the field are to make sure that taxes and fees for
licenses are being paid for by all boat owners. This general
attitude needs to be changed into a responsibility for man-
agement of coastal resources and a striving for sustainable
economic development.
The traditional aim of intensification in coastal resource
exploitation needs to be changed in favour of goals of conser-
vation and sustainable use. At present, however, few if any of
the stakeholders perceive the coastal resources as being over-
exploited. Therefore, awareness of the status of the resources
must be raised at the national level before the political sup-
port for conservation can be expected to grow. Immediate
investments are needed in the education and training of re-
sponsible individuals in coastal resources management. In
this framework, there is also an urgent need to raise aware-
ness amongst fisheries’ managers about protected areas being
potential tools to achieve optimum yields from coastal fish-
eries rather than just being toys for environmentalists.
The centralized and ‘top-down’ approach has not been
successful in achieving sustainable exploitation of natural re-
sources in Indonesia. Decentralization and involvement of
the various stakeholders in a co-management system are ur-
gently needed (Sloan & Sugandhy 1994). But to give
co-management a chance, a legislative and policy framework
must be established, with a place for all stakeholders involved
in exploitation and conservation of fisheries’ resources. As
this needs to take place at the highest level, the importance of
including the central government in discussions on fisheries
management is indisputable (Pomeroy & Carlos 1997). The
‘top-down’ approach of the central government merely needs
to be changed into a role of supporting co-management in-
terventions through legislation, funding and enforcement.
The open access nature of the sea can be regarded as one
of the major problems that lead to destructive fishing prac-
tices. Privatization of common property is seen as the future
in natural resources management ( Jentoft & McCay 1995),
but this needs the imbedding of definitions of property rights
in a legal framework (Pomeroy & Carlos 1997), which is a te-
dious process. Traditional communal property rights are
usually not written down (Ruddle 1993; Zerner 1993), and
have eroded during the last decades (Kendrick 1993; Zerner
1993). It is the role of the government to specify, legitimize
and enforce the security of property rights to local resources.
Exclusive fishing rights can only lead to improved manage-
ment when actively supported by the government.
Political will
If the Indonesian government is serious about combating the
destruction of its coral reefs, it should implement effective
enforcement programmes, develop legislation to restrict the
open access to fisheries resources, and support the develop-
ment of sustainable fisheries, mariculture and tourism. It may
be obvious that considerable financial resources are needed to
implement the required management interventions, but the
economic analysis of blast fishing and the level of the losses
clearly show that investments in integrated management are
fully justified. Political will needs to be generated to make
these resources available. This political will can only be cre-
ated by presenting the economic picture (Medley et al. 1993).
Taking into account the economic reality, a national govern-
ment striving for economic growth, low unemployment and
social stability, will have to acknowledge the value of undam-
aged and well-managed coral reefs.
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